

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
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O 160944Z JUN 77
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SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

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USNATO TAKE AS IMMEDIATE
FROM US REP MBFR

USSALT TWO
GENEVA FOR SEABED DEL-SLOSS

BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC
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AT ITS JUNE 15 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED IN GENERAL TERMS
THE OUTLINE TO BE USED BY LUXEMBOURG REP (COL. WINTER) IN MAKING
REGULAR AHG ORAL REPORT TO NAC JUNE 17. LUXEMBOURG REP WILL BE
ASSISTED BY UK REP (BOLLAND) AND NORWEGIAN DEPREP (NAERBY). LUXEM-
BOURG REP WILL DRAW ON MATERIAL IN THE OUTLINE, NOT NECESSARILY
USING IT IN FULL. UNLIKE WRITTEN REPORTS TO NAC, THE AD HOC GROUP

DOES NOT UNDERTAKE WORD-FOR-WORD APPROVAL OF THESE OUTLINES, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED AS SPEAKING NOTES.

(COMMENT: IT WAS UNDERSTOOD IN THE GROUP THAT, IF ANY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL ASKED WHETHER THE FRG DATA DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL MET THE CRITERIA SET FMRTH IN PARA 15 OF THE OUTLINE, THE REPORTER WOULD STATE THAT THE TACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE GROUP AND THAT THE MAJORITY OF ITS MEMBERS CONSIDERED THAT THE FRG PROPOSAL DID NOT MEET THESE CRITERIA. END COMMENT.)
THE TEXT OF THE OUTLINE FOLLOWS BELOW:

BEGIN TEXT

1. MY REPORT TODAY ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS COVERS EVENTS SINCE THE OPENING OF THE TWELFTH ROUND OF THE TALKS ON 9 MAY 1977 THROUGH THE PLENARY MEETING OF 16 JUNE 1977. A MAJOR FEATURE OF THIS PERIOD HAS BEEN THE COMPLETE STALEMATE IN THE DATA DISCUSSION AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A WHOLE.

2. YOU WILL RECOLLECT THAT ON THE OCCASION OF OUR LAST BRIEFING IN APRIL, THERE WERE TWO PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE DATA ON US AND SOVIET FORCES AND THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND
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TO START WITH DISCUSSION OF US AND SOVIET FIGURES.

3. BEFORE REVIEWING THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION, I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT GENERAL ISSUES
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WHICH HAVE BEEN ACTIVE OVER THE FIRST SIX WEEKS OF THE NEW ROUND.

4. DURING THIS PERIOD, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE STRESSED FOUR MAIN THEMES: (1) CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVITY, (2) THE FAILURE OF THE WEST TO PROVIDE FOR COMPREHENSIVE ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, (3) THE UNWILLINGNESS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA TO UNDERTAKE IN PHASE I BINDING COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND STAGE OF REDUCTIONS AND (4) THE DESIRABILITY FOR PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE NOT TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, I.E., TO ACCEPT A FREEZE.

5. ON THIS LAST ISSUE OF COMMITMENTS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE STATED WITH EMPHASIS THAT THE EAST WOULD NEVER AGREE TO FIRST-STAGE REDUCTIONS CONFINED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHOUT A BINDING COMMITMENT FROM THESE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS REGARDS THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE.

6. UNDER THE HEADING OF TIMING, THE EAST APPARENTLY HAS IN MIND A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND STAGE WOULD BE CARRIED OUT. THE EXACT MEANING OF THE EASTERN TERM "SCOPE" CONTINUES TO BE AMBIGUOUS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO CALL FOR A COMMITMENT OBLIGATING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL MILITARY FORCES. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE LEFT DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS WHETHER THEY INTEND THAT THE SCOPE FORMULA SHOULD EXTEND TO ARMA-MENTS AS WELL AS MANPOWER. THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THAT THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE REDUCTIONS WOULD REMAIN OPEN UNTIL SECOND-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEY HAVE OFFERED TO CONSIDER WESTERN SUGGESTIONS

AS REGARDS BOTH SCOPE AND TIMING, PROVIDED THAT THESE RESULT IN BINDING GUARANTEES OF REDUCTIONS OF EQUAL VALUE BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A SECOND STAGE.

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USNATO TAKE AS IMMEDIATE

FROM US REP MBFR

USSALT TWO
GENEVA FOR SEABED DEL-SLOSS

BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

7. ON THE SUBJECT OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, EASTERN REPS HAVE REPEATED THEIR COMPLAINT THAT IT IS INEQUITABLE FOR THE WEST TO PROPOSE TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ONLY CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS
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IN A FIRST PHASE WHILE EXPECTING THE EAST TO WITHDRAW THE TANKS AND ALL OTHER ARMAMENTS OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND TO LIMIT THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF ALL THESE ARMAMENTS THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL THAT THE AHG, IN A MESSAGE OF DECEMBER LAST YEAR, REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. EASTERN REPS HAVE STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE POSITIONS TAKEN AT THE RECENT NATO MEETINGS ASSERTING THAT THESE MEANT THAT THE WEST INTENDED TO INCREASE STILL FURTHER ITS ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THIS HELPED EXPLAIN, THEY SAID, WHY THE WEST REFUSED TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

8. IN THE PAST SIX WEEKS ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEC 1975 WESTERN PROPOSAL AND TO REJECT THE NOTION THAT THE EAST RESPONDED ADEQUATELY TO THOSE PROPOSALS WITH ITS FEB 1976 PROPOSAL. DURING THIS PERIOD, WESTERN REPS HAVE EMPHASIZED THE FOLLOWING: (1) THE REASONS WHY REDUCTIONS MUST FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES; (2) THE FAILURE OF THE EAST TO MAKE ANY MOVES WHICH WOULD MODIFY THE OUTCOME IT ENVISAGED IN ITS 1973 PROPOSALS; (3) THE NEED TO TAKE EASTERN GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES INTO ACCOUNT IN EVALUATING ANY OUTCOME; AND (4) THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST CONFORM WITH THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT OF COLLECTIVITY.

9. EASTERN REPS, POSSIBLY WITH THE BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN MIND, HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS THEIR FREEZE PROPOSAL. THEY SAID THE FREEZE WOULD BE ON MANPOWER ONLY AND THAT THIS WAS NOW POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF THE OFFICIAL DATA TABLED BY THE TWO SIDES. FOR ITS PART, THE WEST HAS CONTINUED TO REJECT THIS PROPOSAL BECAUSE A FREEZE WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE THE GREAT EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER.

10. TURNING NOW TO THE STATUS OF EAST/WEST EXAMINATION OF COUNTING RULES AND DATA, THE MAIN OBSERVATION TO BE MADE IS THAT EASTERN REPS HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE IN CLAIMING THAT THE DATA TABLED BY EACH SIDE FOR ITS MILITARY MANPOWER HAS
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DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE MANPOWER PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND IN ARGUING THAT THE OFFICIAL DATA TABLED BY THE TWO SIDES ON THEIR MANPOWER SHOULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

11. THE EXCHANGE OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON DATA HAS CONTINUED IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS, BUT WITHOUT BRINGING THE WEST CLOSER TO THE SOURCES OF THE LARGE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NATO FIGURES FOR THE WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA AND THE FIGURES TABLED BY THE EAST FOR THESE PERSONNEL. WESTERN REPS HAVE IN EFFECT EXHAUSTED THE QUESTIONS THEY CAN PLAUSIBLY PUT BASED ON THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF DATA WHICH HAS THUS FAR BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DATA EXAMINATION PROCESS IS AT PRESENT MAINLY GOING OVER OLD GROUND. THIS SITUATION HAS GIVEN RISE TO EASTERN COMMENTS THAT, IF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN FINDING THE SOURCE OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER, THEN THEY SHOULD ACCEPT THE EASTERN OFFER TO EXCHANGE NATIONAL FIGURES FOR THE MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. WESTERN REPS HAVE HELD TO THE POSITION THAT ANY EXTENSION OF THE DATA DISCUSSION SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE EXCHANGE OF US AND SOVIET DATA. IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN REQUESTS FOR A REPLY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO TABLE NATIONAL FIGURES, WESTERN REPS HAVE NOTED THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES HAVE UNDER STUDY THE ISSUE OF HOW BEST TO MOVE THE DISCUSSION FORWARD.

12. THROUGHOUT THE DATA DISCUSSION TO DATE, THE EAST CONTINUED TO ASSERT IN ANSWERING WESTERN QUESTIONS THAT IT HAS INCLUDED ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ITS FIGURES AND DONE SO IN ACCORDANCE WITH WESTERN COUNTING METHODS. EASTERN REPS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE WESTERN INABILITY THUS FAR TO INTRODUCE A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF TESTING THESE EASTERN CONTENTIONS. IN ANY EVENT, EASTERN REPS HAVE BECOME PROGRESSIVELY MORE SELF-CONFIDENT IN INSISTING THAT OFFICIAL FIGURES PROVE THAT THERE IS NEAR MANPOWER PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN

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CENTRAL EUROPE AND PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR INSTITUTING AN IMMEDIATE MANPOWER FREEZE AND FOR EQUAL PERCENT OR NUMBER REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IN A FIRST AGREEMENT.

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AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK BY POUCH

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USNATO TAKE AS IMMEDIATE

FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO
GENEVA FOR SEABED DEL-SLOSS

BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

13. THE FACT THAT PRAVDA ON JUNE 8 PUBLISHED EASTERN DATA TABLED
IN VIENNA AND THAT EASTERN SPOKESMEN CONFIRMED THIS DATA IN THE
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POST-PLENARY PRESS CONFERENCE IN VIENNA ON JUNE 10, FURTHER
INDICATES GROWING EASTERN CONFIDENCE AND EASTERN INSISTENCE ON
THE ACCURACY OF THEIR TABLED FIGURES. EASTERN REPS HAVE POINTED
OUT THE SEEMING CONTRADICTION BETWEEN WESTERN ASSERTIONS OF A

SIGNIFICANT MANPOWER DISPARITY FAVORING THE EAST AND THE APPARENT RELUCTANCE BY THE WEST TO ADOPT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO TABLE NATIONAL DATA. IT IS STRONGLY IN THE ALLIED INTEREST TO TRY TO SHAKE EASTERN CONFIDENCE BY INSISTING ON A DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF THE FIGURES PRESENTED SO FAR.

14. IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER EASTERN DATA WHICH WOULD ENABLE A MORE CONCRETE WESTERN CHALLENGE TO EASTERN TOTAL FIGURES, THE AUTHORITY OF THE TABLED EASTERN FIGURES WILL UNAVOIDABLE INCREASE. THE CURRENT STALEMATE GIVES THE EAST OPTIMUM CONDITIONS FOR CHARGING THAT EASTERN FIGURES ARE RIGHT AND NATO ESTIMATES WRONG AND ACCORDINGLY THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS ARE BASED ON FALSE PREMISES. THE AD HOC GROUP BELIEVES, THEREFORE, THAT THE WEST SHOULD MOVE AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO TAKE EARLY STEPS TO MOVE THE DATA DISCUSSION FROM ITS PRESENT IMPASSE AND TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THIS DISCUSSION.

15. THE GROUP CONSIDERS THAT, FROM THE TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, ANY NEW WESTERN DATA DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL SHOULD MEET TWO CRITERIA. (1) IT SHOULD BE NEGOTIABLE AND SUCH THAT IT CANNOT BE REJECTED BY THE EAST WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EASTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION. (2) IF ACCEPTED, IT SHOULD YIELD THE DATA NECESSARY TO HELP IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES FOR EASTERN FORCES AND, IN THIS WAY, TO SUPPORT THE WESTERN CASE FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. END TEXTRESOR

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